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Abstract
Much research suggests that sporting events can trigger domestic vio-
lence with recent evidence suggesting that pre-match expectations (which
can be interpreted as reference points) play an especially important role in
this relationship. In particular, unexpectedly disappointing results have
been associated with large increases in domestic violence. This paper con-
tributes to this literature using a new data set containing every domestic
violence incident in Glasgow over a period of more than eight years. We
find that Old Firm matches, where Glasgow rivals Celtic and Rangers
play, are associated with large increases in domestic violence (regardless
of the timing or the outcome of the match). Non-Old Firm matches tend
to have little impact on domestic violence. Furthermore, we find little evi-
dence for the importance of reference points. Matches with disappointing
outcomes, relative to pre-match expectations, are found to be associated
with unusual increases in domestic violence only in a very limited set of
matches.
Key words: domestic abuse; Scottish football; Old Firm; reference points; loss
aversion.
JEL classification: D03; J12.
1 Introduction
It is clear that there is a link between professional sport and spectator violence.
The most visible and notorious example of this is displayed in the behaviour of
∗We would like to thank Deborah Barton, Bob Hamilton and Martin Smith from Strath-
clyde Police and Lilian Liesveld and Mhairi McGowan from ASSIST (Advocacy, Support,
Safety, Information Services Together) Glasgow, without the support of whom and provision
of data this research would not have been possible. We would also like to thank Rodney
Strachan for his valuable comments.
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the football hooligan (see Burford (1991)). The heyday of football hooliganism
was at its peak in the 1970’s and 1980’s, although it still persists at a signifi-
cant level throughout the world today. While hooliganism represents a major
social problem, it is to a large extent easy to understand within the context
of the sporting contests that provide its platform. Competition between teams
creates spectator rivalry that spills over into violent conflict. In recent times,
an arguably more perplexing manifestation of violence related to professional
sport has been highlighted and has been attracting attention from the media,
public policy makers and academics. This is the relationship between domestic
violence and professional sport. It is more perplexing than hooliganism in that
the violence is not committed in public against rival fans as an extension of the
on field rivalry. Rather, the violence is committed behind closed doors against
spouses and partners.
Perhaps the most high profile example of the link between domestic violence
and football is in Glasgow and relates to the intense traditional rivalry between
the ‘Old Firm’ of Celtic and Rangers. After an Old Firm match on Sunday
September 18, 2011, domestic violence incidents in Glasgow more than doubled
compared to a football free Sunday. This huge spike received widespread media
attention which also drew attention to the fact that domestic violence incidents
are always substantially higher when Celtic play Rangers.1 In March 2011, the
Scottish Government, the police and the Scottish football community formed
the Joint Action Group (JAG) to ‘protect the good reputation of Scottish football
and to contribute positively to efforts to tackle wider social issues – in particular
alcohol misuse, violence and bigotry.’ Tackling domestic violence/abuse was a
centrally stated objective of the JAG report.2 At its simplest, it seems that at-
tendance at a football match, watching the match in the pub, or indeed watching
the match at home, acts as an emotional cue that results in an increased likeli-
hood of domestic violence taking place. In this paper we remain agnostic about
the psychological mechanism through which football causes domestic violence,
but instead focus on the relationship between the particular characteristics of
football matches and variation in the level of domestic violence.3
Academic attention towards domestic violence and professional sport has
come in the form of Card and Dahl (2011). They conduct a study for the US
and consider the link between domestic violence and American football. What
1See ‘Domestic abuse incidents double after Old Firm match’, Daily Record, September
19, 2011; ‘Domestic abuse incidents double after Old Firm game’, The Telegraph, September
20, 2011; ‘Warning over huge rise in Old Firm domestic abuse’, The Herald, September 20,
2011.
2See http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/925/0123798.pdf for the Joint Action
Group Progress Report, December 2011.
3For a discussion of the psychological mechanisms that lead to domestic violence, see Finkel
(2007) who distinguishes clearly between impelling and inhibiting mechanisms.
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distinguishes this study as economics rather than sociology? The relationship
between their study and economic theory is that they provide evidence for the
existence of a rationally expected reference point. The literature on reference
points emerged from the explosion in behavioural economics following Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979)’s presentation of prospect theory. A key aspect of this
theory is loss aversion. Losses matter more than the same sized gains around
a reference point. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) develop this theory so that it is
applicable to situations where the reference point is not clearly defined by a
status quo. Rather, it is defined with regard to rational expectations. Card
and Dahl (2011) investigated whether domestic violence in cities in the US was
associated with the features of the outcome of (American) football games in-
volving the ‘home’ team. Their hypothesis was that fans form expectations of
their team’s performance in a game that can be proxied by the pre-game bet-
ting odds, and evaluate the outcome of the game relative to those expectations.
Whilst they find that there is no increase in domestic violence associated with
expected losses (or indeed a decrease in domestic violence associated with ex-
pected wins) when a team loses unexpectedly there is around a 10% increase
in domestic violence (but no associated reduction in domestic violence for un-
expected wins). This suggests that experiencing a loss relative to expectations
provides fans with an emotional cue that causes them to commit greater than
average levels of domestic violence. The effect is larger the more salient the
game. Salience is defined as games where the team in question is still in playoff
contention, is playing a traditional rival or the game is controversial in terms of
sacks, penalties or turnovers.4
There is a growing body of convincing evidence that decision makers exhibit
loss aversion: the reduction in utility from a loss relative to a reference point is
larger than the gain in utility from an equivalent-sized gain. A well-documented
example of loss aversion is the endowment effect in which the payment required
to sell an item is larger than the willingness to pay (see, for instance, Kahneman
et. al. (1980), Kahneman et. al. (1991) and List (2004)). Other recent appli-
cations consider auctions (Rosenkranz and Schmidt 2007), the housing market
(Genesove and Meyer 2001) and labour supply (following the work of Camerer
et. al. (1997)). Thinking of a decision maker’s total utility as being a weighted
average of ‘consumption utility’ and ‘gain-loss utility’, the evidence in favour
of loss aversion suggests that the gain-loss component has significant weight in
total utility. Loss aversion, however, is not a ubiquitous phenomenon: in some
decision-making environments loss aversion may not be exhibited (see, for exam-
ple, Novemsky and Kahneman (2005), List (2004) and Tversky and Kahneman
4Earlier work on American football and violence by Gantz et. al. (2006) and Rees and
Schnepel (2009) does not investigate the potential role of reference points.
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(1991)). In their study of the labour supply decisions of New York city cab
drivers, Crawford and Meng (2011) found that whether behaviour consistent
with loss aversion around an expected earnings reference point will be observed
depends on whether or not a target level of hours has already been reached (see
also Farber (2008), Farber (2005) and Camerer et. al. (1997)). It is not incon-
ceivable in general that the manifestation of loss aversion, i.e. the weight with
which gain-loss utility enters the total utility equation, might be dependent on
the context of the decision making environment.
In a paper highly relevant to the study conducted here, evidence for a rela-
tionship between professional sport and reference points is found in Priks (2010)
study of unruly fan behaviour (in the form of throwing objects on to the pitch)
in Sweden. He uses league positions as a reference point and finds that the
unfulfilled expectation of a good performance leads to a significant increase in
object throwing rather than bad performance per se. Card and Dahl (2011)
likewise find an unambiguous relationship between upset losses and increased
levels of domestic violence. These works suggest that the total utility of fans in
these leagues is heavily influenced by gain-loss utility. In contrast, for matches
involving Celtic and Rangers in the Scottish Premier League we find very lit-
tle evidence that supports the dependence of preferences on a reference point.
We do not question the notion that fans form expectations and judge outcomes
relative to those expectations, but we hypothesise that the weight with which
gain-loss utility enters total utility depends on the context of the environment,
and in the Scottish Premier League in which there is an intense local rivalry
this weight is very low. Card and Dahl (2011)’s conclusion that upset losses are
associated with spikes in domestic violence was specific to American football,
but our analysis and hypothesis suggest that such conclusions should be applied
to different sporting contexts with caution.
A way to organise how we might think about the relationship between do-
mestic violence and football matches is to split the aspects of the match into
three parts; (1) the existence of the match; (2) the context of the match and (3)
what happens during the match. The existence of the match is likely to matter
more if the competing teams are traditional rivals. The context of the match
can refer to a number of factors such as; the day of the week it is played; whether
it is played during a public holiday; the time the match kicks off; whether the
match matters in terms of determining important league outcomes and whether
the match is broadcast live on television. What happens during the match
could refer to whether the match is controversial in terms of, for example, red
cards, dubious refereeing decisions, big swings in result during the second half
compared to the first half and crucially, given the Card and Dahl (2011) study,
whether the outcome of the match was unexpected.
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The study we have conducted here follows the approach of Card and Dahl
(2011) very closely. Data was supplied by Strathclyde police for all domestic
violence incidents in Glasgow from January 1st 2003 until 5th October 2011.
This can also be disaggregated into police subdivisions within Glasgow. This is
potentially useful because it may allow us to more closely identify areas which
are more likely to be Celtic or Rangers strongholds. The historical pre-match
odds for the matches involving the two teams are freely available on the web
and we can classify whether the subsequent results deviated from the rationally
expected reference point. We control for key factors (to be discussed later)
and our key finding is that the traditional rivalry between the two teams is the
main explanatory variable for domestic violence with regard to its relationship
to football. We find very limited evidence for loss aversion with a rationally
expected reference point. The exception to this is in ‘important’ games at
the very end of the season where the league title is still up for grabs, but the
effect is lost if we extend the definition of importance to include games further
back into the season. In contrast, Card and Dahl (2011) found evidence of an
upset loss effect in all games where the team is still in playoff contention, which
accounts for 68% of the games in their sample (but not in games where the
team is no longer in playoff contention). It is also unclear whether winning
or losing (against each other) makes any difference to the act of engaging in
domestic violence. Violence increases in response to Old Firm matches across
all subdivisions regardless of the result. This relates to a finding in Card and
Dahl (2011) which they admit does not conform to reference point theory. They
find that in games between traditional rivals there is a marginally significant
increase in violence following an upset win.
One message that can be taken from this paper is that the relationship
between professional sport and violence found by Card and Dahl (2011) is per-
haps not easily extended to other sports settings in different locations within
the world. This is not surprising if one considers sports such as rugby union
where spectator violence is virtually non-existent; but it does seem surprising in
the context of the Old Firm where violence has been a persistent problem and
of such recent concern that it triggered the JAG mentioned earlier. Our initial
expectation was that we would find significant increases in domestic violence in
response to unexpected losses. We can only speculate as to why we find such
limited evidence for a reference point effect for domestic violence and football
in Glasgow. One story might be that the traditional rivalry to which Card and
Dahl (2011) refer in the context of American football is small compared to that
between Celtic and Rangers. It is not unreasonable to argue that it is the most
intense sporting rivalry in the world (see the opening chapter in Wilson (2012)
where he compares the Old Firm to other famous football rivalries). It combines
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the rivalry of a city derby alongside a sectarian divide between Celtic identi-
fied with Catholicism and support for Irish Nationalism and Rangers identified
with Protestantism and support for Ulster Unionism. This combination of city,
religious and political rivalry provides for an intensified emotional cocktail. Per-
haps in the case of this Glasgow rivalry, the emotional salience surrounding this
fixture is so intense (reflected in domestic violence), that the negative emotions
that Card and Dahl (2011) find for unexpected defeats in the case of American
football (reflected in domestic violence) are negligible (or at least, insufficient to
trigger domestic violence) in the case of unexpected defeats for the Old Firm.
The emotional investment manifest in the deeply ugly expression of domestic
violence is reserved almost exclusively for the matches played against each other.
In 2012, following a tax dispute with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
(HMRC) Rangers became insolvent and entered administration. Subsequently,
after a failure to reach agreement with creditors, the club was forced to relaunch
and begin life in the fourth league tier of Scottish football. Assuming there is no
change to the way the leagues are structured in Scotland, it will take Rangers
at least three years to return to the Scottish Premier League (SPL) and regular
league fixtures against Celtic. One message to emerge from this paper is that we
should expect to see a major fall in domestic violence incidents in Glasgow due
to the absence of the Old Firm fixtures, so long as the two clubs do not transfer
the intensity of this traditional rivalry to another club. Given the deep history
of the Old Firm rivalry this would seem very unlikely. The predicted reduction
in domestic violence is a side-benefit of the very costly demise of Rangers. From
a policy perspective, policy-makers and agencies have potentially three years to
think about approaches to eliminate the link between Old Firm matches and
domestic violence. Given the positive effect to Scottish football and the economy
(Allen et. al. 2007) of Old Firm matches, ideally a way can be found to help
minimize domestic violence as a scar upon these matches.
2 Data
Our data on domestic violence was obtained from Strathclyde Police which is
responsible for the region of Strathclyde, populated by some 2.3 million in-
habitants, covering an area of 13,624 km2 and containing the city of Glasgow
with a population of approximately 600,000.5 The data contains, for each of
Strathclyde Police force’s 30 subdivisions6 the number of incidents of domestic
violence recorded on each day between 1st January 2003 and 5th October 2011
5These details came from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strathclyde Police and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glasgow, accessed 14/11/2012.
6Details on the subdivisions of Strathclyde Police can be found in Appendix A.
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(a total of 3200 days). Our data is thus a panel with 30 police subdivisions and
3200 days. All incidents of domestic violence recorded by Strathclyde Police are
included in the data, whether the incident resulted in a crime being committed
or not and whether or not the perpetrator was male.7 So that we are able to
associate domestic violence incidents in the early hours of the morning with
events that took place the day before we constructed the data so that a day in
our sample period runs from 12noon on the day in question until 11.59am the
following day.
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Domestic violence in Strathclyde
Figure 1: Domestic violence in Strathclyde as a whole.
Figure 1 plots the data on domestic violence in Strathclyde as a whole over
the sample period (aggregated across subdivisions), and Table 1 presents the
summary statistics for the data for various types of days in the sample period.
As is evident, there is a general upward trend in the number of domestic vio-
lence incidents reported,8 and there is considerable variation in the number of
incidents of domestic violence across days of the week with a greater number
of domestic violence incidents on average at the weekend, as one would expect.
There is also a sharp rise in domestic violence around Christmas and New Year.
In Table 1 we also include the level of domestic violence when Celtic and/or
Rangers are engaged in football matches. These summary statistics tell us two
things: a) the fact that domestic violence incidents increase on days when Celtic
or Rangers play suggests the need for further investigation of the source of this
7The data include occasional incidents that were recorded as occurring somewhere other
than in the home. However, since the incident reported is domestic violence (not general
assault) we expect these incidents to occur in the vicinity of the home and will, in particular,
not taint the pattern of domestic violence between police sub-divisions.
8This may be due to increased awareness or better reporting methods and not necessarily
due to an increase in the number of incidents.
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increase; and b) when investigating this it is important to control for year, day
of the week and Christmas holiday effects.9
No. Obs. Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
All days 3200 64.46 22.0 12 225
Mid-week 1829 53.06 13.76 12 218
Friday 457 81.20 17.96 34 225
Saturday 457 93.49 19.00 46 178
Sunday 457 64.34 17.80 23 161
Xmas/NY 91 90.32 34.82 45 225
2003 365 48.70 16.63 12 138
2004 366 56.25 17.19 28 160
2005 365 57.58 18.04 19 151
2006 365 63.64 18.61 30 118
2007 365 64.10 19.83 31 151
2008 366 72.48 22.05 37 218
2009 365 71.35 23.00 30 173
2010 365 69.94 22.99 32 225
2011 278 79.81 22.82 40 161
Celtic plays 328 79.98 24.18 35 178
Rangers plays 329 81.61 24.92 35 178
Table 1: Summary statistics for the number of domestic violence incidents in Strathclyde as
a whole. ‘Mid-week’ incorporates Monday through Thursday inclusive. The Xmas and New
Year holiday is defined as 24th December to 3rd January inclusive. Note that our sample
finishes part way through 2011.
We collected data on all Scottish Premier League (‘SPL’) football matches
that involved either Celtic or Rangers during the sample period10 from the
information that is freely available on the Web.11 Each year the SPL season
runs from August to May. There are 12 teams in the league. The league has an
unusual structure in that the year is divided into two parts. In the first part,
each team plays each other 3 times. In the second, the league splits into upper
and lower sections consisting of 6 teams in each. Teams then proceed to play
one further game against each team in their section. This provides a total of
38 games in a league season. There are no playoffs in the SPL. Teams receive
3 points for a win, 1 point for a draw and no points if they lose, and the team
that accumulates the most points after 38 matches wins the league. There is
relegation from the SPL each season and this explains why there are 18 teams
in the data set.
For each season all matches that took place in the season are listed along
with several details of the match: the ‘home’ and ‘away’ teams, the half-time
and full-time results and some information about the match (such as the number
9Initial examination of the data suggested that Monday through Thursday have similar
levels of domestic violence and, hence, can be grouped into one mid-week category. Further-
more, after controlling for the Christmas holiday period there is no evidence of monthly effects
which are, therefore, not included.
10We restrict our attention to league matches and do not include any Cup fixtures in our
data.
11We used the website http://www.football-data.co.uk to collate this data.
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of fouls and the number of ‘bookings’). In our sample, Celtic played 328 games
and Rangers played 329 games.12 35 of these are the Old Firm matches where
Celtic and Rangers play each other. Of the Old Firm matches in the sample,
Celtic won 17, Rangers won 13 and there was a draw on 5 occasions. Of the
other matches played, Celtic won 222, drew 43 and lost 28, and Rangers won
213, drew 53 and lost 28.
The two teams under consideration are generally the dominant teams in
the SPL; this is reflected both in the fact that either Celtic or Rangers won
the league in all years in our sample, and in the betting odds. Information on
pre-match betting odds offered by a number of bookmakers for a home win,
a draw, and an away win is included in the football data. The betting odds
are available for around 10 bookmakers for most of the sample,13 and from the
quoted decimal odds we calculate the average (across all available bookmakers)
pre-match probability that Celtic and Rangers will win each match they play
during the sample period. Figures 2 and 3 plot the probability of winning for
Celtic and Rangers respectively for each match against each of the 18 teams in
the SPL.14 The probability of each team winning the matches they are engaged
in suggest that when Celtic and Rangers play each other (Celtic is team 2 and
Rangers is team 16) the match is invariably predicted to be close, and when they
play other teams there is a mixture of matches where the outcome is predicted
to be close or the team is predicted to win.
3 Econometric Methods
We have a panel data set where observations on our dependent variable (number
of domestic violence incidents) differ across time and subdivision. However, our
explanatory variables (e.g. results of football matches, day of week dummies,
etc.) do not vary across subdivisions. This fact means that a regression model
using data for Strathclyde as a whole will be equivalent to a fixed effects panel
data model (and virtually equivalent to random effects panel data models) using
data at the subdivision level. Accordingly, our main results use count data re-
gression models where the dependent variable is the number of domestic violence
incidents in Strathclyde as a whole. In a subsequent section, we present some
results for a mixed effects model using data at the subdivision level. The mixed
effects model allows for coefficients to vary across subdivisions, which will allow
12Our sample period starts and stops during the season.
13Some bookmakers are not quoted for later dates in the sample, but there are others that
only appear later in the sample.
14We have coded the teams that play or have played in the SPL in the sample period as
1=Aberdeen, 2=Celtic, 3=Dundee, 4=Dundee United, 5=Dunfermline, 6=Falkirk, 7=Gretna,
8=Hamilton, 9=Hearts, 10=Hibernian, 11=Inverness [C], 12=Kilmarnock, 13=Livingstone,
14=Motherwell, 15=Partick, 16=Rangers, 17=St Johnstone, 18=St Mirren.
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Figure 2: Pre-match average probability of Celtic winning.
us to identify differential effects across the Strathclyde region resulting from the
features of matches in which Celtic and Rangers are engaged. Since we have
count data we use Poisson versions of each model.15 As noted below (see also
Appendix B), results using a negative binomial model are virtually the same as
Poisson results using aggregate data.
4 Factors to Explain Levels of Domestic Vio-
lence
In the context of football and domestic violence it is hypothesised that fans en-
gaging with a football match involving their preferred team receive an emotional
cue which, whilst unrelated, influences their subsequent decision of whether to
engage in domestic violence. The presence of this emotional cue is determined
by whether a football match involving the fan’s preferred team takes place or
not; its strength may depend on a number of factors related to the context of
the match and what happens in the match. We turn next to discuss the ex-
planatory variables we use to identify games and distinguish between different
types of game that might provide stronger emotional cues and so contribute to
explaining the level of domestic violence.
We classify each day in our sample as falling into one of the four categories:
neither Celtic or Rangers play; only Celtic plays; only Rangers plays; both
Rangers and Celtic play. We further delineate the latter category into those
15We use Stata’s poisson and xtmepoisson commands. Relevant formulae are provided on
page 405 of Stata’s Longitudinal/Panel Data Reference Manual (Release 12).
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Figure 3: Pre-match average probability of Rangers winning.
days where Celtic and Rangers both play but do not play each other (candr¬),
and those days where there is an Old Firm match and they do (oldfirm). The
explanatory variables listed in Table 2 are used in the analysis to distinguish
between types of days. This allows the effect associated with the traditional Old
Firm rivalry to be identified after controlling for any effect that arises from both
teams being engaged in football matches on the same day, as well as identifying
any change in domestic violence associated with either Celtic or Rangers playing
when the other team does not.
Variable No match Only Celtic Only Rangers Celtic & Rangers Old Firm
conly 0 1 0 0 0
ronly 0 0 1 0 0
candr 0 0 0 1 1
candr¬ 0 0 0 1 0
oldfirm 0 0 0 0 1
Table 2: Variables that identify different types of match day.
Two potentially important factors in explaining levels of domestic violence
are whether the match is played ‘at home’ and whether the match is televised.
All Old Firm matches take place in Glasgow either at Celtic Park or at Ibrox
(Rangers’ home stadium), but other matches might be played either at the home
ground or elsewhere in Scotland.16 To control for Celtic and Rangers playing at
home in non-Old Firm matches we define the variables c(r)home that take the
16Since there are other teams based within the region, ‘away’ games may be within Strath-
clyde. We do not take special account of the fact that Partick (a less competitive team that
was not part of the SPL for some of the sample due to relegation) is also based in the city of
Glasgow.
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value 1 if Celtic (Rangers) are playing at home in a non-Old Firm match (and
are zero otherwise). During the sample period 49% of Celtic’s matches were
played at Celtic Park, and 50% of Rangers’s matches were played at Ibrox.
If football matches are not televised live then the fan base engaged with
football is potentially reduced and one might expect the level of domestic vio-
lence associated with non-televised matches to be lower.17 While all Old Firm
matches are televised, the same is not true of other league matches. To account
for this we define the variables c(r)tv that take the value 1 if Celtic (Rangers)
play a non-Old Firm match that is televised (and is zero otherwise).18 Some
55% of non-Old Firm Celtic matches in the sample are televised whilst the same
statistic for Rangers is 51%.
As identified by Card and Dahl (2011), three factors of a match might make
it ‘emotionally charged’, or salient, and therefore provide a stronger emotional
cue for fans that may result in an increased level of domestic violence: whether
the match itself is important in terms of the team winning the tournament they
are contesting; whether the match is against a ‘traditional rival’; and whether
the actual play in the match is particularly heated. We introduce similar classes
of variables to attempt to understand whether emotionally charged matches are
associated with a higher level of domestic violence in Strathclyde.
Card and Dahl (2011) used a measure of ‘playoff contention’ to distinguish
between those games where a team no longer has the chance to win the league,
and those where there is at least a mathematical possibility of winning the
league. If applied to Celtic and Rangers in the SPL (the strongest teams in
the league) this would include all but the very few matches at the end of some
seasons where the winner of the league has already been decided. A more
appropriate definition of ‘salience’ in this regard emerges from a distinct feature
of the SPL: there is a natural break point in each season where the league is split
and the teams in each half of the league play the remaining 5 matches against
each other. If the team is in the top half of the league at this point (which is the
case for both Celtic and Rangers for every season in our sample) and the points
difference between the leader and the second highest team is no larger than 10,
the game is classed as ‘important’. Whilst this measure limits the number of
matches that fall in to this category of salience, we believe that it accurately
reflects salience for these teams in the SPL. The variables c(r)imp take the value
17Note, however, that in the UK there are ‘football roundup’ programmes broadcast on
television, and matches may be aired on radio.
18The SPL website www.scotprem.com has a record of all matches televised live from the
2008-09 season on. For earlier years, a comprehensive web search was undertaken to ascertain
whether matches were televised live or not. We believe the combination of these data sources
has provided us with a reliable measure of which matches are televised and which are not.
Whilst we cannot rule out some errors we are confident that if there are any they are very
few, and do not cause a systematic bias.
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1 if Celtic (Rangers) play a non-Old Firm match and it is ‘important’: 7.5% of
Celtic’s matches and 7.1% Rangers’ matches are important. oldfirm imp takes
the value 1 if an Old Firm match is important for either Celtic or Rangers,
which is true of 14% of Old Firm matches.19
Another feature that may cause a match to be salient in the eyes of fans
is when their team plays against a traditional rival. The Old Firm is perhaps
the leading example in the world of such a traditional rivalry, and naturally we
control for matches where Celtic and Rangers play each other, as previously dis-
cussed. In the SPL there are only a few other traditional rivalries that involve
Celtic or Rangers that we might want to account for: when Celtic play Hearts
and Rangers play Hibernian, and when either team plays Aberdeen.20 To ac-
count for these matches we define the variables c(r)vstr that take the value
1 if Celtic (Rangers) plays Hearts (Hibernian) or Aberdeen, and is otherwise
zero. In our sample 19.8% of Celtic’s matches and 19.1% of Rangers’ matches
are against a traditional rival.
A slightly less well-defined but potentially important feature that might
make a game salient is whether the play in the match was particularly contro-
versial. To get a handle on this we introduce the variables c(r)ref that take
the value 1 when Celtic (Rangers) play a non-Old Firm match and either the
number of bookings (red and yellow cards) or the number of fouls is larger than
the average of all such games, and is otherwise zero. oldfirm ref is a similar
measure for Old Firm matches.
The outcome of football matches may also influence the strength of the
emotional cue that fans receive. Moreover, as Card and Dahl (2011) explained
in their study, loss aversion – where a loss relative to a reference point incurs a
greater reduction in utility than the increase in utility from an equivalent-sized
gain – which is a very well-documented feature of decision making, may play a
19In the season completed in 2004, 2006 and 2007 Celtic led the league by more than 10
points after the split. Rangers led by more than 10 points after the split in 2010. These
seasons are not salient in terms of the importance of the remaining matches in the season. In
2003, 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2011 the league was extremely competitive until the end of the
season. The 5 matches in each of these 5 seasons are defined as salient.
20Although the link is not as tight as in Glasgow for Celtic and Rangers, in Edinburgh,
Hibernian and Hearts are often associated with Catholicism and Protestantism respectively.
Thus we label Celtic versus Hearts and Rangers versus Hibernian as matches with a ‘tradi-
tional’ sectarian element. The rivalry that both members of the Old Firm have with Aberdeen
stems from the 1980’s when under the management of Alex Ferguson the dominance of the
Old Firm was broken. Aberdeen won the league in 1984 and 1985, the last time a team out-
side the Old Firm managed to do so. Aberdeen also won the European Cup Winner’s Cup in
1983. This has been the only Scottish winner of a European competition since Celtic won the
European Cup in 1967. Given the success of Dundee United in the 1980’s (league winners in
1982 and European Cup semi-finalists in 1983) a case could be made for also including them
as a traditional rival. We accept that our definition of traditional rivalry outside the Old
Firm is to a large extent a subjective judgement; in particular linking the Edinburgh clubs to
religious (or Irish) identity is somewhat controversial. Some would argue that there is only
one traditional rivalry for Celtic and Rangers and that is the match played against each other.
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role in explaining levels of domestic violence. If fans are loss averse then losses
relative to a reference point, that loom larger than gains, will generate a stronger
negative emotional cue and might therefore have some power in explaining levels
of domestic violence.
To determine whether simple match outcomes matter in explaining the level
of domestic violence we define the variables c(r)win/draw/lose that take the
value 1 if Celtic (Rangers) play a non-Old Firm match and win/draw/lose (note
that draws are not uncommon in ‘soccer’, in contrast to American football). In
addition, we define the variables oldfirm draw/close/rlose to identify Old
Firm matches that result in a draw/Celtic losing/Rangers losing. A sensible
hypothesis is that losses provide a negative emotional cue to fans that might
result in higher level of domestic violence. Note that a conclusion of a significant
positive effect on domestic violence from losses but no significant effect from
draws or wins (or a significant negative effect) is consistent with loss aversion
where the reference point is defined as the game being expected to result in a
draw. This could be justified if all fans had expectations that every game is
going to be close; whilst this might be true of Old Firm games, Figures 2 and
3 reveal a different picture for non-Old Firm games. Card and Dahl (2011)
hypothesise that fans may form expectations about their team’s performance in
a match and evaluate the outcome of the match relative to those expectations.
Using pre-match betting odds as a proxy for fans’ expectations, they define
an ‘upset loss’ as a game where the team was predicted to win (the pre-game
point spread is less than −4) and then lost. To investigate this issue in the SPL
we categorise match outcomes relative to the pre-game probability of winning,
the construction of which was discussed in Section 2. To clearly define what is
expected and unexpected we follow Card and Dahl (2011) who take pre-game
betting odds as a proxy for expectations and postulate (somewhat arbitrarily
but we believe sensibly given the observed pre-match betting odds) that if the
pre-match winning probability is at least as large as 70% (q ≥ 0.7) then the
team is expected to win, if 0.7 < q < 0.25 the game is expected to be ‘tight’ and
if q < 0.25 then the team is expected to lose. This definition leads to a variable
that is consistent with reality in the SPL which is that all Old Firm games are
expected to be tight. Both Celtic and Rangers are strong teams in the SPL and
two patterns are apparent from the pre-match probabilities of winning plotted
in Figures 2 and 3: a) neither team could be classed as ever being expected to
lose; and b) for Old Firm games the prediction is always that the game will be
tight. As a result of a) there will never be ‘upset wins’ in our data (where a
team is expected to lose but wins) and b) suggests that nothing ‘unexpected’
will happen in an Old Firm game. For non-Old Firm matches we classify the
outcome of the match in relation to the pre-match winning probability (q) as
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one of the categories detailed in Table 3, for which we define indicator variables
for both Celtic and Rangers.
Prob. win Lose Draw Win
q ≥ 0.7 favlose favdraw favwin
q < 0.7 tightlose tightdraw tightwin
Table 3: Match outcomes relative to pre-game expectations.
5 Results and Discussion
In this section we report the results of our attempts to try to explain the level
of domestic violence in Strathclyde as a whole using various features of football
matches discussed in Section 4. Our empirical results are presented in Tables 4
and 5. Table 4 presents the first set of empirical results investigating whether
the presence, context and outcome of football matches involving Celtic and
Rangers can explain levels of domestic violence. Table 5 goes on to investigate
whether levels of domestic violence can be explained by match outcomes when
evaluated relative to expectations.21
All the explanatory variables we use are dummy variables; the coefficients
should thus be interpreted as the change in the log of the average number of
domestic violence incidents as a result of the indicator variable taking the value
1, or (approximately) the percentage change in the average level of domestic
violence on days that have the characteristics of the indicator variable compared
to days that do not.
In all of the regressions reported in this paper we control for year (2003 is the
omitted dummy variable), day of the week (Saturday is the omitted variable)
and the Christmas and New Year holiday period (using the variables detailed
in Table 1) which are all strongly significant in each regression. Of note is the
observation that the coefficient for xmas ny which identifies days between 24th
December to 3rd January inclusive is consistently around 0.33, signifying a 33%
increase in domestic violence during the holiday season.
In model (A1) we regress the total number of domestic violence in Strath-
clyde on the basic match indicator variables, and find a strong significant effect
21Our data is over-dispersed (the mean is 65.4 whilst the variance is 485.5) so whilst coeffi-
cients estimated by Poisson regression methods will be unbiased the standard errors may be
biased downwards, so we report robust standard errors that inflate the standard errors by a
factor given by the ratio of the variance to the mean. We also estimated each model using
negative binomial regression methods, which yields results that are almost identical to our
reported results using Poisson regression (estimates of these models can be found in Appendix
B).
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(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
conly -0.00659 -0.00409 -0.0717∗ -0.0547 -0.0657∗
(0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0408) (0.0369) (0.0378)
ronly -0.00578 -0.00452 -0.0467 -0.0411 -0.0355
(0.0132) (0.0146) (0.0302) (0.0295) (0.0305)
candr 0.134∗∗∗
(0.0208)
candr¬ 0.0539∗∗∗ -0.0578 -0.0255 -0.0262
(0.0197) (0.0473) (0.0465) (0.0502)
oldfirm 0.357∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗
(0.0343) (0.0348) (0.0388) (0.0710)
cvstr -0.00213 -0.000442 -0.00549 -0.00845 -0.00631
(0.0223) (0.0217) (0.0210) (0.0213) (0.0216)
rvstr -0.00273 -0.00414 -0.00568 -0.00471 -0.00728
(0.0223) (0.0216) (0.0206) (0.0209) (0.0210)
chome 0.0447 0.0253 0.0277 0.0208
(0.0359) (0.0334) (0.0336) (0.0339)
rhome 0.0278 0.0195 0.0188 0.0184
(0.0298) (0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0291)
ctv 0.0850∗∗ 0.0567∗ 0.0560 0.0591∗
(0.0361) (0.0339) (0.0344) (0.0344)
rtv 0.0578∗∗ 0.0384 0.0384 0.0464
(0.0291) (0.0293) (0.0294) (0.0289)
cimp 0.0906∗∗ 0.0894∗∗ 0.0823∗
(0.0418) (0.0425) (0.0444)
rimp 0.0846∗ 0.0841∗ 0.0771
(0.0483) (0.0486) (0.0504)
oldfirm imp 0.101 0.126∗ 0.106
(0.0655) (0.0685) (0.0685)
cref 0.0174
(0.0195)
rref -0.0133
(0.0211)
oldfirm ref -0.0687
(0.0822)
oldfirm draw 0.388∗∗∗
(0.112)
oldfirm close 0.410∗∗∗
(0.0537)
oldfirm rlose 0.285∗∗∗
(0.0464)
cwin -0.0254
(0.0376)
cdraw -0.0469
(0.0399)
close -0.0323
(0.0514)
rwin -0.0256
(0.0280)
rdraw 0.000181
(0.0366)
rlose -0.0253
(0.0381)
intercept 4.223∗∗∗ 4.229∗∗∗ 4.233∗∗∗ 4.232∗∗∗ 4.233∗∗∗ 4.230∗∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0143)
N 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: The effect on domestic violence in Strathclyde resulting from football matches in-
volving Celtic and Rangers.
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when both Celtic and Rangers play. However, when the Old Firm and other
traditional rivalries are accounted for in model (A2) it is clear that the over-
whelming majority of the effect resulting from both teams playing on the same
day can be attributed to Old Firm matches: with this specification, the average
level of domestic violence in Strathclyde increases by some 36% on days when
there is an Old Firm match, which is of the same order of magnitude as the
Christmas holiday effect alluded to above. Other traditional rivalries, however,
make very little difference. Model (A3) includes our context variables (identi-
fying games that are played at home and those that are televised); model (A4)
includes the effect of games that are ‘important’; and model (A5) includes the
effect of matches involving a greater than average number of fouls or bookings.
Model (A2) suggests that there is a positive and significant effect when both
Celtic and Rangers play, but not each other, which is not present on days when
either Celtic or Rangers play. This effect, however, disappears in model (A3)
which controls for whether the game is televised or not, in which there is a
positive and significant effect of matches being televised. One might expect
a ‘tv effect’ since it expands the base of fans that are engaged with football
and therefore the pool of the population who will experience the hypothesised
emotional cue resulting from the football match. However, this effect itself
disappears in model (A4) which controls for match importance. This can be
explained as follows: Celtic and Rangers are more likely to play matches on
the same day after the split in the league; such matches are more likely to
be televised than the average match; but their defining feature is that they are
more likely to be important. Hence, controlling for the importance of the match
is necessary so that spurious relationships are not identified: it would be easy
to recommend from model (A2) that Celtic and Rangers’ matches should not
be scheduled on the same day, but model (A4) suggests this is an incorrect
recommendation.
Model (A5) controls for matches involving a greater than average number
of fouls or bookings. None of these effects are significant, but the negative
coefficients, particularly in Old Firm matches, suggest that this is perhaps not
an appropriate measure of salience for soccer. The same conclusions hold if the
variable is defined to identify only those matches where the number of fouls or
bookings are at least one standard deviation larger than the mean of all such
matches. Indeed, it is easy to conceive that bookings that are not made by the
referee could equally make the game emotionally charged.
In terms of explaining domestic violence using match indicator and context
variables model (A4) is our preferred specification, which demonstrates that
there is a large and significant Old Firm effect that is augmented (but not sig-
nificantly so) when the match is also important. However, when Rangers and
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Celtic are engaged in matches against other teams in the SPL there is no signif-
icant effect on the level of domestic violence, even when the match is against a
non-Old Firm traditional rival. Indeed, the negative signs on the coefficients of
c(r)only and candr¬, although not particularly significant, suggest that when
fans engaged with such matches the incidence of domestic violence is actually
reduced. Moreover, whether the team plays at home or away makes no difference
to this conclusion. Whether the match is televised or not is mildly significant
for Celtic (p-value=0.094) but not for Rangers (p-value=0.189). There is a pos-
itive and significant additional effect when Celtic and Rangers are engaged in
matches against other teams that are important (9.1% and 8.5%, respectively)
relative to non-important matches. However, the overall effect of important
matches for Celtic and Rangers (which combines the coefficients on various ex-
planatory variables) is often insignificant. For instance, the effect of when either
Celtic or Rangers play, when both teams play but not each other and one of
the teams plays an important match (p-values of 0.551 for Celtic and 0.458 for
Rangers), and when both teams play but not each other and both matches are
important (p-value=0.102), are insignificant even at the 10% level. However, for
Celtic and Rangers non-Old Firm matches that are both important and televised
there is a significant additional effect (p-values of 0.001 for Celtic and 0.013 for
Rangers), and the overall effect on match days when either Celtic or Rangers
play matches that are both televised and important is statistically significant
(p-values of 0.026 when only Celtic play and 0.085 when only Rangers play).
Our main findings so far can be summarized as saying: it is not football
in general that is associated with domestic violence, but Old Firm matches in
particular, with the possible exception of non-Old Firm matches that are both
important and are televised.
Model (A6) controls for the outcome of matches. The results of this model
demonstrate that when Celtic and Rangers are engaged in non-Old Firm matches
there is very little heterogeneity in the effect on domestic violence according to
the outcome of the match. Win, lose or draw the effect is largely similar, and
indeed insignificant. Given the similarity of the coefficient estimates for each
team for each type of outcome, whether the match is important and/or tele-
vised has a similar effect to that discussed in model (A4). One notices from
the estimated coefficients of model (A6) that there is heterogeneity in the Old
Firm effect depending on the outcome of the match: it is highest at 41% when
Celtic lose, which is similar to the effect of a draw, and lowest at 29% when
Rangers lose. The increase in domestic violence associated with any Old Firm
match is large, but it seems that this effect is amplified when the outcome is
not in Celtic’s favour. However, whilst the difference in the coefficients seems
large, the p-value of the test of the similarity between the effect of Celtic losing
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and Rangers losing is 0.065, suggesting a null hypothesis of the effect being the
same cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance.
We now turn to the question of whether reference points are important
in triggering domestic violence. The results in table 5 investigate whether
match outcomes relative to pre-match expectations (proxied by pre-match bet-
ting odds) have any power in explaining the level of domestic violence. Despite
the fact that in model (A6) there was no discernible effect on domestic violence
of non-Old Firm matches regardless of the outcome of those matches, it may
be the case that for those matches that resulted in a loss and that loss was
unexpected (an ‘upset’ loss) there is a significant effect on domestic violence, as
discussed extensively in Card and Dahl (2011) and as found in their data. By
classifying match outcomes relative to pre-match betting odds as described in
Table 3 we can test whether this is the case in Strathclyde.
Model (B1) is the same as model (A6) of Table 4 except that explanatory
variables which categorise match outcomes according to pre-game betting odds
are included. The results of this model demonstrate a striking feature that
stands in stark contrast to the findings of Card and Dahl (2011, Table IV, p 25).
They found that, whilst outcomes that accord with expectations have no effect
on domestic violence (whether they are wins or losses), there is a statistically
significant 10% increase in the level of domestic violence in the team’s home
city when that team plays a game that it loses when it was expected to win.
Furthermore, they also found this effect to be significantly different from the
effect of an upset win. This allowed them to conclude that, when outcomes
are evaluated relative to a reference point that is formed by expectations, losses
have a larger negative impact on the level of domestic violence than a gain (the
effect of which is insignificant). We are not finding this. Our results would be
consistent with this if the coefficients on either the favlose or favdraw variables
for Celtic and Rangers are positive and significant, but they are negative and
insignificant.22 We do not find any explanatory variable which reflects match
outcomes relative to pre-match betting odds to be significant. Unexpected losses
do not seem to trigger domestic violence in our data set.
The preceding result was based on all matches. That is, model (B1) in-
cludes explanatory variables which, e.g., reflect unexpected losses throughout
the season. It is possible that unexpected losses only have an impact in salient
22Since our data is over-dispersed we use robust standard errors in hypothesis testing. One
fear is that using robust standard errors over-inflates the standard errors, in turn making
p-values larger than they should be, favouring a conclusion of no significance. However, even
when the data is over-dispersed coefficient estimates from Poisson regression are unbiased so
any conclusion of significance with non-inflated standard errors would only allow us to deduce
a reduction in domestic violence. Indeed, when the estimation is repeated using non-robust
standard errors or using the negative binomial model our conclusions do not change.
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(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5)
All matches Importance Extended importance Traditional rival Referee active
cfavwin -0.0306 -0.0197 -0.0440 -0.0166 -0.0426
(0.0389) (0.0375) (0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0414)
ctightwin -0.0240 -0.00753 -0.0414 -0.0295 -0.0491
(0.0422) (0.0412) (0.0409) (0.0437) (0.0708)
cfavdraw -0.0570 -0.0652 -0.0864∗ -0.0869∗ -0.0788
(0.0463) (0.0467) (0.0477) (0.0470) (0.0603)
ctightdraw -0.0406 -0.0296 -0.0479 -0.0637 -0.0696
(0.0451) (0.0463) (0.0539) (0.0515) (0.0938)
cfavlose -0.0124 -0.0415 -0.0643 -0.0169 0.00471
(0.0604) (0.0590) (0.0783) (0.0691) (0.0985)
ctightlose -0.0689 -0.0575 -0.0823 0.00139 -0.00111
(0.0651) (0.0639) (0.0634) (0.0552) (0.0726)
rfavwin -0.0321 -0.0377 -0.0374 -0.0352 -0.0118
(0.0318) (0.0315) (0.0326) (0.0317) (0.0361)
rtightwin -0.0215 -0.0336 -0.0492 -0.0154 -0.0250
(0.0316) (0.0310) (0.0343) (0.0320) (0.0356)
rfavdraw -0.0133 -0.0239 -0.0273 -0.00687 -0.0224
(0.0463) (0.0469) (0.0520) (0.0500) (0.0626)
rtightdraw 0.0133 0.0262 0.0448 -0.0145 0.0255
(0.0445) (0.0455) (0.0463) (0.0509) (0.0645)
rfavlose -0.0241 -0.0315 -0.0237 -0.0402 -0.0904∗∗
(0.0469) (0.0466) (0.0513) (0.0512) (0.0457)
rtightlose -0.0252 -0.0379 -0.0415 -0.0476 -0.194
(0.0487) (0.0502) (0.0510) (0.0764) (0.142)
cfavwin sal 0.0123 -0.0190 -0.0728∗ -0.0261
(0.0799) (0.0479) (0.0409) (0.0418)
ctightwin sal -0.0165 -0.00162 -0.00289 -0.0270
(0.101) (0.0648) (0.0461) (0.0447)
cfavdraw sal 0.372∗∗∗ 0.0677 0.147∗∗ -0.0445
(0.141) (0.143) (0.0709) (0.0524)
ctightdraw sal 0.0184 -0.0685 -0.0146 -0.0410
(0.0349) (0.0446) (0.0464) (0.0460)
cfavlose sal 0.208 0.0357 0.0215 -0.0416
(0.128) (0.0832) (0.0891) (0.0493)
ctightlose sal omitted omitted -0.132 -0.107
(.) (.) (0.0867) (0.0782)
rfavwin sal 0.0189 -0.0219 -0.0346 -0.0423
(0.0736) (0.0477) (0.0458) (0.0330)
rtightwin sal 0.0400 0.0303 -0.0759 -0.00354
(0.126) (0.0409) (0.0466) (0.0389)
rfavdraw sal 0.240∗∗∗ 0.0218 -0.0423 0.00168
(0.0308) (0.0572) (0.0625) (0.0507)
rtightdraw sal -0.0858∗∗ -0.108 0.0213 0.0139
(0.0389) (0.0679) (0.0637) (0.0539)
rfavlose sal omitted -0.133∗ 0.0372 0.0484
(.) (0.0680) (0.0895) (0.0661)
rtightlose sal 0.159∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ -0.0250 0.0158
(0.0726) (0.0513) (0.0381) (0.0434)
oldfirm draw 0.388∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
oldfirm close 0.410∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗
(0.0536) (0.0537) (0.0536) (0.0535) (0.0537)
oldfirm rlose 0.285∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0463) (0.0465)
cvstr -0.00549 -0.00887 -0.00751 0.00278
(0.0222) (0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0235)
rvstr -0.00812 -0.00951 -0.0125 -0.0164
(0.0218) (0.0207) (0.0221) (0.0218)
chome 0.0251 0.0187 0.0359 0.0199 0.0283
(0.0352) (0.0351) (0.0352) (0.0349) (0.0362)
rhome 0.0252 0.0312 0.0330 0.0252 0.0210
(0.0331) (0.0328) (0.0337) (0.0332) (0.0333)
ctv 0.0634∗ 0.0557 0.0775∗∗ 0.0573∗ 0.0671∗
(0.0349) (0.0341) (0.0337) (0.0342) (0.0367)
rtv 0.0457 0.0507∗ 0.0619∗∗ 0.0502∗ 0.0402
(0.0286) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0291) (0.0286)
cimp 0.0775∗ 0.0736∗ 0.0757
(0.0441) (0.0421) (0.0464)
rimp 0.0771 0.0651 0.0770
(0.0507) (0.0486) (0.0511)
oldfirm imp 0.105 0.106 0.105 0.105 0.106
(0.0685) (0.0686) (0.0685) (0.0685) (0.0687)
intercept 4.230∗∗∗ 4.231∗∗∗ 4.230∗∗∗ 4.230∗∗∗ 4.230∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0143)
N 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: The effects of match outcomes relative to expectations on domestic violence in
Strathclyde
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games. This issue is considered in Card and Dahl (2011, Table VI, p 30). They
considered whether the upset loss effect persisted in both salient and non-salient
games, where salience was defined in three ways: games where the team was still
in playoff contention; games against traditional rivals; and games that are partic-
ularly frustrating for fans. Their findings are that “the overall rise in...[domestic
violence incidents]...following an upset loss is driven entirely by losses in games
that “matter” the most to fans”: coefficient estimates of the increase in domestic
violence for upset losses in games that possess one of the salience characteristics
are at least twice as large as in games that do not possess that characteristic.
For our data this hypothesis is investigated in models (B2) to (B5). In these
models matches are split into two types – those that possess the salience charac-
teristic listed at the top of each column and those that do not – and are further
characterised by the match outcome relative to pre-match expectations as in
model (B1). The coefficient estimates reported in the first block of the table are
for those matches that do not have the salience characteristic of the column,
and the second block of estimates is for those matches that do. So, for example,
column (B2) distinguishes between games that are ‘important’ and those that
are not; the first set of parameter estimates are for matches that do not have
the importance characteristic, and the second set of parameter estimates are for
matches that are important. Note that the parameter estimates in the second
block (post-scripted with sal) give the total effect on domestic violence from a
match that possesses that characteristic, rather than the additional effect over
and above non-salient matches (which would be the case if we just ‘controlled’
for matches that have the salience characteristic in question).
Model (B2) distinguishes between those matches that are classed as non-
important in the upper block and those matches that are important in the
second block. As discussed in Section 4 our measure of match importance is
purposefully restrictive to focus attention on those matches at the end of the
season, where the title is still to play for, that are particularly salient for fans.
The consequence is that there are few observations, and indeed two parameter
estimates are omitted as there are no observations that fall into those categories.
We found in model (A4) that matches that are important do have a significant
effect on levels of domestic violence. The results of model (B2) suggest that
in important games there is indeed an upset loss effect that is not present in
games that do not have the importance characteristic: when Celtic are predicted
to win and draw domestic violence increases by 37% (p-value 0.008) compared
to a reduction of 6.5% in non-important games (p-value for a test of equality
between the coefficients is 0.001); when they are predicted to win but lose
domestic violence increases by 21% (although this is not statistically significant
due to the large standard error resulting from very few observations of this
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type – p-value=0.104). Similarly, when Rangers are predicted to win and draw
domestic violence increases by some 24% which is strongly significant. This
can be compared to an effect of -2% in non-important games (p-value for test
of equality ≈ 0). In addition, when Rangers play an important game that is
predicted to be tight and they lose there is a significant 16% effect on domestic
violence (p-value=0.028) which is significantly different from the effect in non-
important games (p-value for test of equality is 0.008). Of note is the realisation
that in important games that the teams win, there is no significant effect on
domestic violence. Moreover, the effect of expected draws has no significant
effect in the case of Celtic, and in fact a significant negative 9% effect for Rangers
(p-value=0.027). In conclusion, in those games that are classed as important,
there seems to be a significant effect on the level of domestic violence of a
disappointing outcome where the team loses when they are either expected to
win or the game is expected to be tight (although our definition of importance
means this conclusion is drawn from few observations). Moreover, there is a
significant effect on domestic violence when a team draws, but only when they
were expected to win; games that result in a draw but were expected to be tight
have no significant effect on domestic violence levels. As such, in important
matches we identify an ‘upset non-win’ effect, but it seems to be the act of
losing that matters, rather than necessarily losing unexpectedly.
In model (B3) we expand the definition of importance to incorporate the
last 10 matches of the season where the team has a mathematical possibility
of winning the league. This expands the number of matches that are classed
as important, but very interestingly changes the conclusion that there is an
upset-loss effect: all coefficients, except in Rangers matches that are predicted
to be tight but they go on to lose, are insignificant. The significant 16% effect
of Rangers losing games which were expected to be tight is in fact based on
a single match which took place on Thursday 22nd May 2008 when Rangers
played away at Aberdeen (losing 2-0). On the same day Celtic played away to
Dundee United and won 1-0 and the combination of these matches meant that
Celtic won the league, which was previously undecided. This in itself makes this
match particularly important, but this was at the end of a season during which
Rangers also lost the UEFA Cup final in Manchester on 14th May. Following this
loss there was extensive rioting in Manchester city centre where the match was
televised on big screens. The average number of domestic violence incidents
midweek in 2008 was 61.5 but following Rangers’ defeat on 22nd May 2008
there were 77 reported domestic violence incidents. Excepting this single match,
extending the definition of importance means we cannot conclude an ‘upset non-
win’ effect: there is some evidence that losses relative to expectations have a
significant effect on the level of domestic violence in Strathclyde, but this is true
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only in those particularly salient matches right at the end of the season where
the title is still to play for.
Model (B4) distinguishes between matches against non-Old Firm traditional
rivals and those against other teams. The parameter estimates in the first block
are for explanatory variables relating to matches against non-rivals, those in
the second block are for matches against traditional rivals. Here there is very
little evidence of upset losses or non-wins having a significant effect on domes-
tic violence in games against traditional rivals, the exception being that when
Celtic are favourite and draw against a traditional rival there is, on average, a
15% increase in domestic violence which is significant (p-value=0.038) and sig-
nificantly different from the effect of the same matches not against traditional
rivals (p-value for test of equality is 0.001). This effect does not materialise
for Rangers, and moreover when the teams are favourite to win but then lose
in matches against traditional rivals there is no significant effect on domestic
violence.
For completeness, model (B5) distinguishes between those games where the
number of fouls or bookings was greater than average. We found in model (A5)
that this measure of salience is perhaps not appropriate to the SPL and indeed
the results of model (B4) confirm that in games that have this characteristic
there is no upset loss or non-win effect.
The overall picture from our empirical results is that the dominant effect
on domestic violence is associated with Old Firm matches: when an Old Firm
match takes place the average level of domestic violence increases by some 28-
41% depending on the outcome. Football matches that do not involve an Old
Firm clash, are not salient, do not involve other traditional rivals and are not
televised tend to be associated with a reduction in the average level of domestic
violence. Match outcomes matter very little in explaining levels of domestic
violence, and the same is true when outcomes are considered relative to expec-
tations. Only in games that are particularly salient is there a significant effect
that results from upset non-wins, but importance has to be defined very tightly
in order to get this result.
6 Mixed effects
One potential drawback of our analysis stems from fans of the two teams under
consideration being located in the same city. It may be the case, for example,
that when Rangers suffer an upset loss Rangers fans suffer negative emotions
causing an increase in domestic violence whilst Celtic fans enjoy positive emo-
tions causing a reduction in domestic violence thereby not allowing us to identify
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the effect on domestic violence from Rangers fans alone. There is an objection
in principal to this drawback, which is that whilst negative outcomes have been
found to be associated with increased levels of domestic violence, positive out-
comes, even related to the fans own team, have not been found to be associated
with a significant change in violence both domestic and otherwise (see Card
and Dahl (2011) for domestic violence and Priks (2010) for hooliganism). Since
we have data by subdivision and in some areas of Glasgow in particular and in
Strathclyde more generally there are distinct districts where the overwhelming
majority of football fans are either Celtic supporters or Rangers supporters,
we can estimate a mixed effects model and by allowing some carefully chosen
parameters to vary across subdivisions determine whether in those areas where
domestic violence increases when there is bad news for Celtic (Rangers) it also
reduces when there is bad news for Rangers (Celtic).
The mixed effects Poisson model involves grouping the explanatory variables
into those with constant coefficients (Zt) and those with coefficients which vary
across subdivisions (Wt). If yit is the number of domestic violence incidents in
subdivision i on day t then Poisson panel data models assume:
Pr (yit = y|αi) = exp (−λit)λ
y
it
y!
(1)
for y = 0, 1, ... The mean is given by:
λit = exp (Ztβ +Wtαi) . (2)
The vector of varying coefficients, αi has a multivariate Normal distribution with
diagonal error covariance matrix. Note that mixed effects models can be difficult
to estimate precisely when the dimensionality of αi becomes too large. Accord-
ingly, it is common to allow for only a few explanatory variables to have varying
coefficients, a practice that we follow here. In particular, we re-estimate model
(B1) but allow the coefficients for oldfirm close, oldfirm rlose, cfavlose
and rfavlose to vary across subdivisions. These are the coefficients that we
would expect to vary across subdivisions if there are distinct Rangers (Celtic)
neighbourhoods.
In practice, we find very little evidence that coefficients are varying across
subdivisions. The average coefficients estimates (i.e. β and the mean of αi)
are basically the same as those of model (B1), and so are not presented here.
Appendix C gives estimates (and standard errors) of the deviation of each coeffi-
cient from the average in each of the 30 police subdivisions. For two of the vari-
ables with subdivision-varying coefficients (oldfirm close and rfavlose) these
deviations are essentially zero. For the remaining two variables (oldfirm rlose,
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cfavlose) there is more evidence that their impact varies across subdivision.
However, even for these variables, almost all of the estimated deviations are less
than one standard deviation from zero and none are more than two standard
deviations from zero.
The drawback referred to at the beginning of this sub-section would mani-
fest itself if the correlation between the coefficients on cfavlose and rfavlose
or on oldfirm close and rfavlose, or on oldfirm rlose and cfavlose were
strongly negative. These correlations would mean in subdivisions where domes-
tic violence increases when Celtic fans receive bad news it reduces when Rangers
fans receive bad news. The correlations between the point estimates (ignoring
the fact that standard errors tend to be quite large) are given in Table 6. These
correlations tend to be quite small and do not fit a pattern which would lead to
countervailing Rangers and Celtic effects masking each other.
oldfirm close oldfirm rlose cfavlose rfavlose
oldfirm close 1.0000
oldfirm rlose 0.3889 1.0000
cfavlose -0.3400 -0.2059 1.0000
rfavlose -0.2183 -0.2296 0.3952 1.0000
Table 6: Correlations across sub-divisions between random effects.
The fact that our results using a mixed effects model on subdivision level data
do not indicate substantial variations in coefficients could be due to the scale
of police subdivisions. That is, the average police subdivision contains about
75,000 inhabitants and this degree of spatial resolution may be too coarse to pick
up effects associated with neighbourhoods of a particular sectarian hue. But, at
least the findings of this section are suggestive that our results of Section 5 are
not missing important effects due to regional variations within the Strathclyde
region.
7 Conclusion
When investigating the effect of American football on levels of domestic violence
in the US, Card and Dahl (2011) found that there is a significant positive effect
on domestic violence in a team’s home city when that team suffers an upset
loss. We investigate whether the same is true in the area surrounding Glasgow
focussing on games that involve Celtic and Rangers. We find that there is a
very large and significant effect on domestic violence associated with Old Firm
matches of the same order of magnitude as the increase in domestic violence
around Christmas and the New Year. We test for the effect of upset losses but
find very little evidence to support the conclusion: we only find this evidence in
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a very limited set of matches where the battle to win the league is particularly
intense.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the manifestation of loss aversion and the
influence of losses in sport relative to expectations on the incidence of domestic
violence very much depends on the context of the league. In the SPL where there
is a strong traditional rivalry in the form of the Old Firm upset losses play very
little role in explaining levels of domestic violence, which increase significantly
on days when an Old Firm match is played. The hypothesis of Card and Dahl
(2011) implies that there is a kink in the payoff function of fans at the expected
outcome. Our hypothesis is that the angle of this kink is reduced by other
salient features of the league. If there are other more dominant factors that
fans care about then other matches don’t feature so much in their emotions.
Between the 2011 and 2012 seasons Rangers went into administration and
subsequently was required to leave the SPL and play in the third division. In
the 2012 season, therefore, Celtic remain in the SPL but are playing without the
presence of the traditional Old Firm rivalry. This provides a natural experiment,
and we look forward in the next few years to revisiting this question to ascertain
whether there is any change in the pattern of fans’ behaviour subsequent to this
important change to the league. From a public policy perspective there is also
an opportunity to take stock of the effect of Old Firm matches on domestic
violence and ask whether more could be done to help eliminate the link between
the two given that Old Firm matches will no doubt be restored in the coming
years when Rangers return to the SPL.
A Strathclyde Police subdivisions
Strathclyde Police is headquartered in Glasgow and covers an area of 13,624
km2 and a population of some 2.3 million. It is divided into 8 divisions, and
further delineated into 30 subdivisions, which are listed below:
A Glasgow Central and West
1. AB Glasgow City Centre
2. AC Anderston
3. AD Glasgow West End
4. AE Drumchapel
B Glasgow North East and East Dunbartonshire
5. BA Calton and East Centre
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6. BC Springburn and Western Glasgow North East
7. BD Baillieston, Shettleston and Eastern Glasgow North East
8. BE Maryhill/Kelvin and Canal
9. BF East Dunbartonshire
G Glasgow South and East Renfrewshire
10. GA Govan and Craigton
11. GB Greater Pollok and Newlands/Auldburn
12. GC East Renfrewshire
13. GD Linn and Langside
14. GE Pollokshields East and Southside Central
K Renfrewshire and Inverclyde
15. KA Paisley
16. KB Johnstone and Renfrew
17. KC Inverclyde
L Argyll, Bute and West Dunbartonshire
18. LA Dumbarton, Helensborough and Clydebank
19. LB Argyll and Bute
N North Lanarkshire
20. NA Monklands
21. NC Cumbernauld and Kilsyth
22. ND Bellshill
23. NE Motherwell and Wishaw
Q South Lanarkshire
24. QA East Kilbride and Strathhaven
25. QB Hamilton Area
26. QC Clydesdale
27. QD Rutherglen and Cambuslang
U Ayrshire
28. UA North Ayrshire
29. UC East Ayrshire
30. UD South Ayrshire
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B Negative binomial regressions
This section contains estimates of the models presented in Tables 4 and 5 using
negative binomial regression methods.
(A1nb) (A2nb) (A3nb) (A4nb) (A5nb) (A6nb)
conly -0.00488 -0.00204 -0.0702∗ -0.0526 -0.0625∗
(0.0124) (0.0133) (0.0385) (0.0352) (0.0362)
ronly -0.00457 -0.00378 -0.0460 -0.0393 -0.0351
(0.0132) (0.0146) (0.0299) (0.0286) (0.0296)
candr 0.142∗∗∗
(0.0211)
candr¬ 0.0596∗∗∗ -0.0527 -0.0208 -0.0230
(0.0204) (0.0452) (0.0448) (0.0484)
oldfirm 0.366∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗
(0.0344) (0.0351) (0.0392) (0.0701)
cvstr -0.00360 -0.00208 -0.00694 -0.00948 -0.00771
(0.0225) (0.0217) (0.0210) (0.0214) (0.0216)
rvstr 0.000644 -0.00129 -0.00402 -0.00320 -0.00474
(0.0224) (0.0216) (0.0200) (0.0203) (0.0206)
chome 0.0437 0.0244 0.0266 0.0205
(0.0340) (0.0321) (0.0323) (0.0324)
rhome 0.0253 0.0160 0.0155 0.0176
(0.0297) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0282)
ctv 0.0847∗∗ 0.0561∗ 0.0557∗ 0.0572∗
(0.0343) (0.0329) (0.0333) (0.0330)
rtv 0.0599∗∗ 0.0384 0.0387 0.0463∗
(0.0288) (0.0279) (0.0281) (0.0274)
cimp 0.0895∗∗ 0.0884∗∗ 0.0841∗
(0.0421) (0.0427) (0.0452)
rimp 0.0981∗ 0.0978∗ 0.0929∗
(0.0508) (0.0510) (0.0530)
oldfirm imp 0.0900 0.117 0.107
(0.0698) (0.0731) (0.0731)
cref 0.0153
(0.0191)
rref -0.0100
(0.0207)
oldfirm ref -0.0736
(0.0824)
oldfirm draw 0.394∗∗∗
(0.112)
oldfirm close 0.425∗∗∗
(0.0531)
oldfirm rlose 0.291∗∗∗
(0.0480)
cwin -0.0241
(0.0357)
cdraw -0.0415
(0.0379)
close -0.0301
(0.0504)
rwin -0.0257
(0.0271)
rdraw 0.00246
(0.0350)
rlose -0.0270
(0.0383)
intercept 4.222∗∗∗ 4.228∗∗∗ 4.234∗∗∗ 4.232∗∗∗ 4.233∗∗∗ 4.229∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139)
N 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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(B1nb) (B2nb) (B3nb) (B4nb) (B5nb)
All matches Importance Extended importance Traditional rival Referee active
cfavwin -0.0292 -0.0208 -0.0442 -0.0173 -0.0416
(0.0370) (0.0363) (0.0365) (0.0369) (0.0389)
ctightwin -0.0201 -0.00659 -0.0410 -0.0249 -0.0459
(0.0405) (0.0406) (0.0396) (0.0434) (0.0706)
cfavdraw -0.0517 -0.0613 -0.0796∗ -0.0810∗ -0.0691
(0.0441) (0.0447) (0.0453) (0.0453) (0.0592)
ctightdraw -0.0325 -0.0241 -0.0400 -0.0610 -0.0623
(0.0440) (0.0462) (0.0537) (0.0511) (0.0924)
cfavlose -0.0134 -0.0429 -0.0655 -0.0270 0.00391
(0.0607) (0.0613) (0.0795) (0.0699) (0.0982)
ctightlose -0.0598 -0.0515 -0.0753 0.00348 0.000369
(0.0629) (0.0623) (0.0616) (0.0547) (0.0715)
rfavwin -0.0308 -0.0364 -0.0369 -0.0351 -0.0140
(0.0310) (0.0307) (0.0324) (0.0311) (0.0358)
rtightwin -0.0206 -0.0328 -0.0499 -0.0181 -0.0213
(0.0302) (0.0295) (0.0333) (0.0310) (0.0342)
rfavdraw -0.00240 -0.0140 -0.0156 0.00371 -0.00916
(0.0438) (0.0446) (0.0503) (0.0469) (0.0586)
rtightdraw 0.00643 0.0189 0.0387 -0.0169 0.0173
(0.0432) (0.0440) (0.0448) (0.0502) (0.0641)
rfavlose -0.0198 -0.0275 -0.0175 -0.0382 -0.0965∗∗
(0.0471) (0.0468) (0.0523) (0.0517) (0.0461)
rtightlose -0.0330 -0.0444 -0.0476 -0.0643 -0.226
(0.0502) (0.0519) (0.0530) (0.0828) (0.156)
cfavwin sal 0.0172 -0.0140 -0.0769∗ -0.0255
(0.0825) (0.0480) (0.0408) (0.0397)
ctightwin sal -0.0190 0.00309 -0.00779 -0.0250
(0.0982) (0.0638) (0.0457) (0.0427)
cfavdraw sal 0.340∗∗ 0.0482 0.132∗ -0.0455
(0.150) (0.147) (0.0703) (0.0502)
ctightdraw sal 0.0228 -0.0644 -0.00480 -0.0343
(0.0342) (0.0444) (0.0475) (0.0436)
cfavlose sal 0.213 0.0413 0.0368 -0.0456
(0.132) (0.0878) (0.0946) (0.0467)
ctightlose sal omitted omitted -0.124 -0.0984
(.) (.) (0.0860) (0.0755)
rfavwin sal 0.0319 -0.0127 -0.0335 -0.0370
(0.0762) (0.0475) (0.0441) (0.0323)
rtightwin sal 0.0762 0.0387 -0.0661 -0.00510
(0.136) (0.0407) (0.0451) (0.0377)
rfavdraw sal 0.243∗∗∗ 0.0322 -0.0350 0.00940
(0.0293) (0.0589) (0.0599) (0.0497)
rtightdraw sal -0.0826∗∗ -0.105 0.00925 0.00992
(0.0391) (0.0702) (0.0597) (0.0513)
rfavlose sal omitted -0.132∗ 0.0510 0.0521
(.) (0.0678) (0.0864) (0.0635)
rtightlose sal 0.151∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ -0.0265 0.00926
(0.0747) (0.0521) (0.0383) (0.0435)
oldfirm draw 0.394∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
oldfirm close 0.425∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗
(0.0530) (0.0531) (0.0530) (0.0530) (0.0531)
oldfirm rlose 0.291∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.0480) (0.0481) (0.0480) (0.0479) (0.0481)
cvstr -0.00825 -0.0107 -0.00931 0.000774
(0.0221) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0235)
rvstr -0.00451 -0.00601 -0.00868 -0.0132
(0.0214) (0.0201) (0.0218) (0.0211)
chome 0.0249 0.0211 0.0364 0.0219 0.0279
(0.0336) (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0344)
rhome 0.0214 0.0284 0.0300 0.0221 0.0178
(0.0321) (0.0315) (0.0331) (0.0320) (0.0323)
ctv 0.0606∗ 0.0549∗ 0.0757∗∗ 0.0564∗ 0.0644∗
(0.0336) (0.0333) (0.0326) (0.0335) (0.0351)
rtv 0.0459∗ 0.0507∗ 0.0620∗∗ 0.0518∗ 0.0400
(0.0271) (0.0269) (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0273)
cimp 0.0799∗ 0.0774∗ 0.0780∗
(0.0451) (0.0440) (0.0470)
rimp 0.0941∗ 0.0816 0.0939∗
(0.0530) (0.0519) (0.0536)
oldfirm imp 0.107 0.107 0.106 0.107 0.107
(0.0731) (0.0733) (0.0731) (0.0731) (0.0733)
intercept 4.230∗∗∗ 4.231∗∗∗ 4.230∗∗∗ 4.230∗∗∗ 4.230∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140)
N 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C Mixed effects model
Subdivision-specific estimates of difference from the average coefficient using the
mixed effects model.
oldfirm close oldfirm rlose cfavlose rfavlose
subdivision est se est se est se est se
Average .4098667 .0265469 .2791021 .0318814 -.0183021 .0429036 -.0241429 .0379596
1 -3.51e-10 .0000178 .0145717 .0886246 -.0095377 .0894032 4.19e-11 3.16e-06
2 4.80e-10 .0000178 -.0409088 .0907704 -.0320484 .0906564 3.11e-11 3.16e-06
3 -2.25e-09 .0000178 .0137195 .0829717 -.0188492 .0857157 -8.82e-11 3.16e-06
4 -5.77e-10 .0000178 -.0761421 .0756436 -.0839154 .0802242 1.04e-12 3.16e-06
5 1.16e-09 .0000178 .0026258 .075548 -.0258421 .0803736 -5.05e-11 3.16e-06
6 -2.27e-09 .0000178 .0157724 .0774168 -.0346071 .0819714 7.07e-11 3.16e-06
7 2.82e-10 .0000178 .0409148 .0703918 .0416579 .0760176 -3.17e-11 3.16e-06
8 2.57e-09 .0000178 -.0749129 .077453 .0480438 .0802122 8.06e-11 3.16e-06
9 1.11e-09 .0000178 .0966942 .0815901 -.0189568 .0854004 -1.77e-11 3.16e-06
10 -6.59e-11 .0000178 .0363059 .0763423 -.0023609 .0810696 -5.81e-11 3.16e-06
11 -1.93e-09 .0000178 .0295256 .0794474 -.0098541 .08332 7.16e-11 3.16e-06
12 1.71e-09 .0000178 .0022421 .0855686 -.0097254 .0873371 -2.17e-11 3.16e-06
13 -9.01e-10 .0000178 -.0970828 .0815881 .05686 .0831927 3.59e-11 3.16e-06
14 -5.82e-13 .0000178 -.0736117 .0794008 .0474526 .0817793 -4.90e-11 3.16e-06
15 -1.43e-09 .0000178 -.0805147 .0751176 -.0256493 .079118 -5.56e-11 3.16e-06
16 -2.48e-09 .0000178 .0571618 .0777625 .0284044 .0820093 -2.77e-11 3.16e-06
17 1.25e-09 .0000178 .023115 .0776008 .0039263 .081798 7.74e-11 3.16e-06
18 -3.34e-09 .0000178 -.0254234 .0696729 -.0142166 .0752988 -8.06e-11 3.16e-06
19 5.59e-10 .0000178 -.0348854 .0840499 -.053969 .086357 -7.09e-12 3.16e-06
20 5.03e-09 .0000178 .1320052 .0703782 -.041735 .0781926 -8.76e-11 3.16e-06
21 -1.46e-09 .0000178 .0287002 .0801809 -.0467895 .0841426 3.75e-11 3.16e-06
22 -1.73e-09 .0000178 -.0463458 .0822698 .0236056 .0844319 -6.21e-12 3.16e-06
23 2.93e-10 .0000178 .0501145 .0737266 .0964271 .0781128 6.91e-11 3.16e-06
24 3.13e-09 .0000178 .0334464 .0827286 -.0120527 .0856436 -1.92e-11 3.16e-06
25 2.92e-09 .0000178 .0095051 .074862 -.0304066 .0799846 3.68e-12 3.16e-06
26 -1.77e-09 .0000178 .0174798 .0854602 .0438677 .0870294 3.86e-11 3.16e-06
27 1.61e-09 .0000178 .0043046 .081856 -.009639 .0848042 1.68e-11 3.16e-06
28 4.31e-09 .0000178 .0711645 .0675177 -.0654568 .0755525 -7.93e-11 3.16e-06
29 -2.76e-09 .0000178 -.0932648 .0744157 .0716652 .0772259 4.76e-11 3.16e-06
30 -3.12e-09 .0000178 -.0073519 .0730897 .1064985 .076761 5.66e-11 3.16e-06
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